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Dissenting Voices 
 
My focus in this chapter is both backward and forward looking.  I look back to consider the 
distinctive manner in which issues about the new technologies were initially framed and forward to 
practical and conceptual strategies that might be deployed to enhance the agency of all women whose 
childbearing decisions may be influenced by these new techniques.  First, I briefly summarize 
perspectives that shaped debate in the 1970s and early 1980s.  For early perspectives cast light on the 
subsequent influence of the fertility industry and representation of infertility issues by the mass media.  
Particularly critical is their newfound power of the industry to displace traditional childbearing 
expectations, reconfigure public perceptions, and redefine public policies.  My primary aim is to situate 
feminist perspectives within broader debates about the implications of reproductive innovations.  Then I 
move to more detailed consideration of feminist efforts to reclaim women's agency, revalue mothering, 
uncover underlying patterns of social stratification, and reappraise power relations.  
The1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first IVF baby, ushered in a new era, a path to fulfillment for 
some, a source of frustration for others.  Lesley Brown had been unable to conceive for nine years.  
Diagnosed with blocked fallopian tubes, she futilely went from doctor to doctor before referral to Dr. 
Patrick Steptoe in 1976.  For the past decade Steptoe and physiologist Robert Edwards had been 
experimenting on techniques to circumvent infertility. They had successfully found a way to fertilize an 
egg outside a woman's body and transfer it in her uterus, but when Brown arrived in Steptoe’s office none 
of the eighty pregnancies they had initiated had lasted more than a few weeks.  She consented to undergo 
in vitro fertilization (IVF).  But she was not told that the procedure was experimental and had never 
resulted in a live birth.  This time it worked!  Louise Brown was born through a planned caesarean section 
weighing five pounds, twelve ounces.  Four years later her younger sister, Natalie, was conceived through 
IVF as well.  She became the world's fortieth IVF baby and was the first to give birth the old-fashioned 
way. Today Louise Brown has her own child, also conceived without the assistance of IVF.   
The birth of Louise Brown was surrounded by contentious international controversy about in 
vitro fertilization which still reverberates today.  Data on the odds of a live birth following the use of 
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are now widely available--though still incomplete.  But other 
issues persist.  Some herald the proliferation of as a victory of humans over nature; others as a tragic 
violation of nature.  As Maura Ryan notes:  
in debates over whether ART enhances or diminishes women’s agency, the social 
meaning of infertility often works both sides of the table, with those who support the 
growth of ART and those who oppose it invoking the same set of societal and cultural 
norms” (2009).  
Louise Brown’s birth prompted the formation of numerous national and international policy 
panels.  In 1978 the U.S. government convened an Ethics Advisory Board which commissioned a group 
of papers examining ethical issues raised by research into the early embryo. Responses varied 
considerably. Some prominent bioethicists questioned whether emerging reproductive technologies raised 
any new moral problems at all (Gorovitz 1982).  Others saw in the same techniques a cluster of novel 
issues centering on the moral status of embryos and fetuses. Three orientations predominated.  
Conservatives questioned any interventions that tampered with nature's way of doing things or traditional 
social practices.  Liberals tended to take a laissez faire attitude.  Some stressed the reproductive freedom 
of individual patients and the autonomy of researchers and clinicians.  Others emphasized the importance 
of expanding knowledge about reproductive processes and deferring moral assessment of new techniques 
until their impact was evident.  More radical perspectives which were not represented on the Board 
tended to divide into two camps: those who favored reproductive innovations for the sake of the 
technological future they would facilitate and those opposed to all technological innovations.  These 
groupings overlapped the public policy approaches that emerged in the 1980s but at early stages in 
development of innovative modes of reproduction, debate still had a relatively speculative cast.  Practical 
concerns were not paramount.  For no country had yet initiated a process to establish formal regulatory 
policy. 
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Conservative critics exerted a powerful influence over government policy and public sentiment, 
particularly in the U.S.  They feared that technological developments would yield too much power and 
control to researchers and special interests. Their stance was shared in part by some feminists who were 
critical of the newfound powers of the medical establishment.1 After U.S. President George W. Bush was 
elected in 2000 and established his Council on Bioethics, conservatives were able to implement much of 
their program and wield wider influence over mainstream bioethics.2  Clinical applications of assisted 
reproduction remained in private hands, but federal funding for research involving embryos was halted. 
A leading conservative spokesperson for opposition to assisted reproduction was Protestant 
theologian Paul Ramsey who served on the U.S. Ethics Advisory Board in 1979-1980.3  Like the 
Vatican's subsequent Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation (1987), Ramsey objected to all forms of reproductive innovation other than medical or 
surgical treatment of primary infertility (1972).  Ramsey's arguments, however, merit attention on 
nonreligious grounds too, for they reveal assumptions common to the views of several groups (including 
radical feminists with incompatible agendas) and they provide a context for interpreting several different 
positions.  I summarize them briefly, noting their relevance to subsequent feminist debate. 
First, Ramsey argued that it is a violation of the norms of medical ethics to expose a possible 
human being to unnecessary risk.  Only risks undertaken out of benefit to the patient or with a patient's 
explicit informed consent are warranted.  Since a merely possible human cannot grant consent, it is not 
morally permissible to jeopardize its future well-being. 
At that time it was not yet known whether embryos fertilized in the laboratory were likely to 
develop normally.  Subsequent experience has allayed the most extreme fears about this issue but new 
practices revived this objection.  However, no empirical evidence warrants the assumption underlying this 
conservative objection: that the preimplantation embryo merits moral status equivalent to a newborn 
child.  Moreover, this objection speaks only to deliberate direct manipulation.  It ignores possible side-
effects of other foreseeable interventions including administration of hyperovulatory drugs and premature 
birth resulting from transfer of multiple embryos, an increasingly common practice.4  The selectivity of 
such conservative criticisms of medical interventions raises doubts about the underlying priorities of their 
advocates.  From whose perspective is "unwarranted risk" to be viewed?  Why should distrust of medical 
powers focus so selectively on preimplantation embryos rather than medical risks to the patient 
undergoing treatment?   It was left to feminist critics of the technologies to extend the case against 
unwarranted risk to women patients and unrestrained expansion of medical power. 
Ramsey also claimed that disassembling and reassembling procreation and parenthood violated 
the "natural piety" appropriate to these activities.  Increasing voice over nature, he warned, increases 
power over humans and risk of abuse.  Critics pointed out that the bare claim that something is natural has 
no moral weight of itself.  Such an appeal needs more substantial support.  Feminists turned Ramsey’s 
argument in further directions.  Some cautioned against ideologies that seek mastery over nature.  Others 
called attention to gender-specific norms that undergird prevailing conceptions of nature and social 
reality.   
Leon Kass also contributed to the EAB and subsequently chaired the second President Bush’s 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission offered a variant of Ramsey's second argument that is still a 
mainstay of conservative objections to ART today.  Kass substituted for Ramsey's appeal to nature an 
appeal to traditional social practices.  He would allow for innovative arrangements so long as they do not 
violate the traditional sense of human sexuality and the experience of relatedness to one's biological 
                                                            
1 In succeeding years, however, as conservative perspectives hardened into dogma most feminists drew away.  
2 They brought onboard not only traditional conservatives but a number of former liberals who adopted a position 
known as neoliberalism. For a critique of this group from the perspective of a mainstream bioethicist see Ruth 
Macklin 2006. 
3 For a more extended discussion of the EAB see the preceding chapter. 
 
4 LP: However, very recently there has been a successful movement in some countries and circumstances to use SET 
or strictly control the number of embryos transferred. 
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ancestors and descendants.  Feminist critics expressed doubts that family relationships modeled on 
traditional patriarchal norms were preferable to other constructions of family.5 
Ramsey’s third argument contended that the proper role of medicine is limited to the correction of 
medical conditions.  Additional measures would extend intervention beyond proper medical practice to 
the treatment of human desires.  Dissenters objected to this extremely narrow conception of medicine’s 
proper role.  They pointed out that many other physical deficits cannot be reversed either, but when the 
lost function is highly valued, means are found to circumvent the incapacity.  Few outside of certain 
religious communities object, for instance, to organ and tissue transplantation.6  And nonmedical 
substitutes for physical impairments, such as prosthetic limbs or eyeglasses, are commonly accepted.7  
Ramsey’s conception of the proper boundaries of medical intervention also catches in its net many other 
widely available interventions.  Birth control and abortion can be justified on grounds other than bodily 
incapacity. Pregnancy and childbirth are routinely monitored by physicians but are not, strictly speaking, 
medical conditions either. Many other interventions are motivated by desires as well, including cosmetic 
plastic surgery, sex change operations, and penile enlargements.  Medical mediation to satisfy these 
desires may be controversial but is generally tolerated in most industrialized countries though third party 
payers may be reluctant to cover the costs.  So infertility treatment is hardly unique among medical 
interventions that do not aim to reverse physical impairments.   
However, such criticism does point to the difficulty of distinguishing between needs and desires 
and favoring certain desires as worthy of medical attention.  This issue crops up frequently in feminist 
debates about the technologies and is a principal focus in a later chapter.  A related question that has 
figured prominently in discussion among feminists is this: who is to play the gatekeeping role and specify 
desires that warrant medical attention?  The frequent practice of excluding from infertility treatment 
single women, lesbians, and those too poor to pay the fees raise questions about the social criteria 
employed by medical practitioners and regulatory groups.  Donna Haraway’s path breaking piece: "A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs" spawned widespread critique of the traditional dichotomy between the natural 
and the artificial (1985, 1991).  Haraway was influential in shifting the locus of feminist reproductive 
politics from women’s natural capacities to their avowed interests, a point to which I shall return shortly.  
But first, I view alternatives to the conservative position. 
The influence of conservative critics was counterbalanced, in part, by bioethicists who, in large 
measure, supported assisted reproduction practices.  Their views sprang from several theoretical 
orientations that gave priority to the freedom of individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good 
life.  They included both feminists and non-feminists who were to become an object of feminist criticism.  
Particularly prominent were utilitarians such as Jonathan Glover (1984, 1989) and Peter Singer (1984).  
Others, loosely classified as principlists, stressed the primacy of a moral principle such as autonomy or 
beneficence. Those who adopted these views ascribed privileged interpretations and moral weight to their 
principles.8  Among many, including some feminists, primary emphasis fell on maximizing the personal 
                                                            
5 Kass revisits this position in his essay "The Wisdom of Repugnance" (1997, 2003).  There he argues that cloning 
should be rejected because it violates our essential human nature.  He appeals to a sense of repugnance or disgust 
which resembles Mary Warnock's objections to certain earlier reproductive innovations (see previous chapter). 
Lawrence Tribe critiques it in his 1998 article. I consider political dimensions of alternative forms of family 
organization at length in Chapter Seven. LP: AD clearly changed her mind about the contents of Chapter Seven, 
which, in the latest draft discusses the nature and origin of women’s desire for children. 
 
6 This generalization may not extend to some nonwestern countries though several have in recent years revisited 
cultural norms that proscribe organ transplantation and some (such as Japan) have lifted former bans. 
 
7 Of course, bioethicists and policy makers frequently raise consequentialist objections to indiscriminate organ and 
tissue transplantation, particularly, the tendency to divert health care resources to costly interventions at the expense 
of preventive measures that, in the long run, would be far cheaper and benefit many more potential patients.  I pass 
over such issues here as well as discussion of religious groups that reject all (or most) medical intervention 
unselectively, e.g., Christian Scientists. 
8 The leading exponents of principlism are Tom Beauchamp and James Childress. Their seminal book on this theme 
is now in its seventh edition (Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2012). Many more 
theoretical orientations have also influenced bioethics. For a brief introduction to those theories as they relate to 
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autonomy of the agent, particularly concerning matters of reproduction. The most vociferous advocates 
for a version of this position are still champions of the fertility industry.  Some of them extend the scope 
of the autonomy principle from contexts in which it is most plausible (e.g. contraception and abortion) to 
third party reproduction (e.g. gamete donation and surrogacy) with little qualification. 
Medical researchers have eagerly proclaimed themselves to be the defenders of infertile women.  
Some couch their arguments in appeals to nature, claiming (contrary to conservative scholars such as 
Ramsey) that failure to satisfy the biologically given desire for a child is to suffer the effects of an 
unfulfilled life. Practitioners who administer infertility treatment are, they maintain, merely offering 
nature "a helping hand."  Legal theorists, in their turn, more often couple appeals to autonomy with a 
right to procreate, arguing that such a right is firmly embedded in Western liberal traditions.9  They point 
to U.S. judicial decisions that affirm the right of individuals, at least within marriage, to control their own 
reproductive activity. This freedom is often taken to derive from a right to privacy, a domain within 
which individuals may pursue their own life plans with minimal societal interference.  Of course, 
affirmation of reproductive rights may also be grounded in other principles that do not support the 
individualistic conception of autonomy that undergirds classical liberalism.  In succeeding chapters I lay 
the groundwork for an alternative conception of reproductive rights. 
Despite increasing appeals to reproductive rights, many conservatives and some feminists resist 
the use of rights language.  Even theorists who employ this language differ considerably about the 
foundation of rights claims and their proper scope.  Affirmations of reproductive rights that emphasize the 
freedom of individuals to procreate without state interference are comparatively uncontroversial.  Most 
legal rulings supporting reproductive freedom in the U.S. lean principally on rights of noninterference 
(the law ought not to intervene in efforts of individuals to avoid procreation).  However, some influential 
liberal supporters of innovative technologies advocate extending such individualistic norms to an 
increasingly broader range of third party medical interventions including legal recognition of contracts for 
goods and services that require the active recruitment of third parties.  Critics point out that exclusive 
attention to the rights of individuals to pursue their procreative plans without restriction ignores other 
morally relevant considerations. They point, particularly, to other people's rights of noninterference and to 
the future well-being of fetuses.  Furthermore, not everyone is comparably situated to commit to contract 
pregnancy or to ovum ‘donation’ or to decline an offer of substantial payment.  Such extensions of 
individual rights, they point out,  neglect the institutional constraints that frame such choices, social 
disparities between the privileged and the marginalized, and more inclusive societal concerns that are not 
reducible to individual interests. 
Utilitarians often oppose limitations on individual liberties unless demonstrable harm will result.  
Critics, both traditionalist and feminist, fault this approach for disregarding the social context that shapes 
individual action and for utilizing an overly narrow conception of harm.  However, not all utilitarian 
theorists are insensitive to social effects of the technologies.  Some count only the number of individuals 
who will be directly harmed and consider only harms that would be acknowledged by an "objective 
rational observer."  But others include the severity of the harm and count indirect harms too.  A few 
recognize that what counts as harm depends on circumstances peculiar to time and place. The quarrel 
between Richard Hare and Mary Warnock alluded to in the previous chapter illustrates a common version 
of utilitarian thinking.  However, Warnock's rejoinder to Hare does not fit comfortably with the moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
feminist bioethics see Tong (Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and 
Practical Applications, Westview Press, 1997). 
 
9 This viewpoint has been developed most extensively by U.S. philosophers and legal theorists. As new reproductive 
techniques proliferated, the scope of this position has been extended to justify state protection for reproductive 
contracts requiring the recruitment of third parties, though some versions reflect a libertarian perspective more than 
a liberal one.  Supporters are likely to emphasize continuities with established legal traditions.  Legal scholar John 
Robertson has elaborated on this view in many law review articles and a 1994 book, Children of Choice: Freedom 
and the New Reproductive Technologies, Princeton University Press. He also participated in drafting reports and 
statements for the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine available at 
http://www.asrm.org.  Feminist versions of this position were developed by Israeli legal scholar, Carmel Shalev 
(1989) and U.S. legal commentator, Lori Andrews (1988, 1989) who has since modified her earlier stance.  In the 
following chapter I discuss in greater detail issues arising out of this interpretation of reproductive rights. 
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orientations I discuss here. Her position springs from "moral intuitionism" which takes its cues from 
people's allegedly intuitive revulsion, inhibitions, and scruples.10  In a later chapter I consider other 
formulations of the liberal view that have featured prominently in recent debates about innovative modes 
of procreation. 
 
Feminist Debates: The Early Years 
Feminist deliberations about links between reproductive technologies, women’s well-being, and 
their liberties were well underway long before the advent of IVF.  However, over ensuing years  IVF has 
become a ‘platform’ technology that facilitates not only the production of a genetically related child but 
also a child with specific qualities, such as  freedom from genetically transmitted disorders, enhanced 
performance, or the preferred sex.  For the displacement of fertilization from women’s bodies to the 
laboratory facilitates multiple interventions including genetic manipulation, and reproductive cloning.  
However, all of these make use of women’s reproductive capacities.  So I focus discussion around 
women’s perspectives, particularly feminist discourse about the significance of such interventions and the 
framing of public policy.  
Already, before the turn of the century, feminists such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman boldly 
envisioned a procreative revolution based on technological innovations.11  But not until the 1970s did this 
vision become scientifically plausible. Enthusiasts eagerly proclaimed the coming millennium when 
gestation would no longer take place within women’s bodies.  Some saw such transformation primarily as 
a means to advance the interests of individuals, but the feminists who shared this vision looked to 
technological transformation as an unproblematic way to ameliorate women's social condition.  In their 
futuristic vision, expansion of reproductive technologies to include laboratory gestation would enhance 
human freedom, equalize the social position of women, and liberate them from bondage to their bodies. 
This enthusiasm for wholly extrauterine gestation soon subsided, but factors that motivated it are echoed 
in two distinctive contemporary responses to the technologies. One stresses the freeing potential of 
technology. The other emphasizes the oppressive influence of patriarchal social structures. I briefly 
consider each within its particular context. 
The technological wizardry that has sustained (some) infants who are thrust into the outer world 
at increasingly shorter periods of gestation stirs the imagination of those who view technology as a route 
to the solution of moral problems.12  Were pregnancy and gestation optional choices, they reason, tensions 
between maternal and fetal interests could be circumvented.  Thus if a woman did not want to carry a 
                                                            
10  Warnock allies herself with Stuart Hampshire's argument against the utilitarian position.  He writes:  
I must dwell on the epithets usually associated with morally impossible action, on a sense of 
disgrace, of outrage, of horror, or baseness, of brutality, and, most important, a sense that a 
barrier, assumed to be firm and almost insurmountable, has been knocked over and a feeling 
that, if this horrible or outrageous, or squalid, or brutal, action is possible, then anything is 
possible and nothing is forbidden, and all restraints are threatened. These ideas have often been 
associated with impiety, and a belief that God or the Gods, have been defied, and with a fear of 
divine anger. But they need not have these associations with the supernatural and they may 
have...a secular setting.  In the face of the doing of something that must not be done, and that is 
categorically excluded and forbidden morally, the fear that one may feel is the fear of human 
nature. This fear of human nature, and sense of outrage, when a barrier is broken down, is an 
aspect of respect for morality itself rather than for any particular morality and for any particular 
set of prohibitions.” (1978), 9. 
Provisions in the original Warnock Report forbidding cross-species fertilization and creation of chimeras 
were evidently motivated by such a sense of outrage. Leon Kass has articulated a similar view (2003). But as Ian 
Miller points out, the kinds of things that disgust us are highly culture-specific.  Seldom are they closely linked to 
morality and where they are, such feelings are less likely to dictate the correct moral response than to imply a moral 
failing--since disgust often gets in the way of empathy for the unlucky ones whose bodies are less perfect than our 
own (1997). 
11 Note discussion of Gilman’s 1895 utopian feminist novel Herland in Tong, 1993, 41-44. 
 
12 Premature infants face a number of often serious developmental problems. Evidence now indicates that the outer 
limits of premature survival outside the womb may have been reached.  See www.ichd.nih.gov.  
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pregnancy to term she could abort it without causing the death of the fetus.  It could then be transferred to 
a laboratory incubator to be ended by technicians until viability.13  Such scenarios carry forward the 
stance adopted by some feminists in the 1960s and early 1970s who endorsed schemes for social 
transformation that included full laboratory gestation.  Shulamith Firestone's 1970 work, The Dialectic of 
Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, exemplifies the strategy that looks to technological innovation to 
facilitate women's liberation.  Firestone's enthusiasm for technology-driven social change extends beyond 
reproductive technologies to production and labor as well.  For, in her view, the relations of “re-
production” are the base of society and the ground of women's oppression.  Biological difference is a 
limitation that needs to be overcome if women are to be freed from oppressive social institutions.  
Firestone's groundbreaking work carried forward one strand of Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of 
women's sexual subordination in The Second Sex (1953, 2010), the work that set the stage for the 
emergence of second wave feminism in the 1960s.14  Firestone's proposals for the "abolition of all cultural 
categories" (1971, 182) and the transformation of procreation so that "genital distinctions between the 
sexes would no longer matter culturally" (1971, 11) reflects Simone de Beauvoir's appraisal of the roots 
of women's disempowerment.  According to Beauvoir, reproduction is unlike other bodily functions in 
two respects: it is the sole function that is not essential to individual survival and the only one that is 
significantly different in men and women. Hence, she reasons, it is central to the meaning and 
significance of gender and figures essentially in the objectification of women as a "second sex" mirrored 
through male consciousness.15  Firestone extends this analysis to laboratory gestation which, following 
this logic, would release women from captivity to their bodies.  Her work provided a model for a new 
                                                            
13 Glover (1984) and Singer and Wells (1984) who offer versions of a utilitarian view, have proposed this "solution."  
So does Christine Overall in her 1987 book.  Though I would hardly rank her among the technological enthusiasts, 
she does anticipate that technological developments may resolve certain competing moral claims.  She argues that 
since no one owns the fetus, no one (neither the pregnant woman nor the person performing an abortion) has the 
right to destroy it.  But neither does the fetus have a right to the use of the woman's body.  She believes this tension 
will be resolved once "expulsion from the uterus will ordinarily not result in the death of the embryo/fetus" (70).  
Echoing Singer and Wells, she believes that this "solution could satisfy both the liberal, whose desire is to provide 
abortions for women who want them, and the conservative, whose aim is the preservation of fetal life." (79)  In a 
more recent (1993) book Overall qualifies her earlier position, stressing more fully the conditions needed to fully 
protect the reproductive autonomy of the pregnant woman.  Once these conditions are spelled out, it seems far less 
likely that this technological ‘solution’ would reconcile such opposing moral claims.  I cited some objections to this 
solution in the previous note and chapter 1 above. LP: Stephen Coleman, in his recent book The Ethics of Artificial 
Uteruses: Implications for Reproduction and Abortion, mounts powerful feminist (and non-feminist) arguments 
against ectogenesis (Ashgate, 2004). 
 
14 Now that some are advocating a third and even fourth wave, many feminists are rethinking the ‘wave’ metaphor 
and some are abandoning it as too simplistic to capture the complexity of contemporary feminism.  Linda Nicholson 
points out that feminism is not a linear success story.  Reproductive freedom is now more restricted than in the 
previous generation.  Women were in the workforce during the ‘first wave’ before Betty Friedan wrote The Feminist 
Mystique, but they were predominantly working class.  Nicolson argues that the “third” and “fourth” waves have 
depoliticized feminism and cast academic feminists in a negative light (from a 2009 talk to NY SWIP, see her 
subsequent “Feminism in ‘Waves’: Useful Metaphor or Not? New Politics, Winter 2010, 12(4), 34.) For a classic 
view note Nancy Cott’s The Grounding of Modern Feminism (1989).  For more recent views see the several articles 
in Hypatia 12:3, 1997, Claudia Card’s criticism of third wave claims in Hypatia 21:2, 2006, 223-229, Jennifer 
Purvis’ synopsis of third wave views, her alternative formulation (2004), and Nancy Fraser’s distinctive program for 
a new third wave (2007). 
 
15 Similarities in the assumptions made by Firestone and de Beauvoir are far more extensive than indicated in the 
brief allusions cited here.  Both incorporate similar distinctions between the realms of nature and culture and both 
take literally the meaning of ‘reproduction’ as re-production, mere repetition involving no productive activity. 
Because of this connotation some feminists avoid this term altogether but, as I indicated in my introduction, Jaggar 
and McBride (1985) opt instead to assimilate it to the more positively valued term “production” since the activities 
associated with procreation and nurturing are as fully productive--as vital to species survival and enhancement--as 
the activities commonly called productive. Further, the new translation of The Second Sex (2010) casts doubt on the 
accuracy of this interpretation of de Beauvoir’s view.  
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genre of feminist utopian fiction and provoked profound questions about the political significance of 
reproductive technologies that would engage feminists for many years. 
According to this liberatory scenario, a determinate sequence of transforming events would usher 
in a reproductive revolution.  Before gestation and birth were given over to technological control, the 
stage would have already been set by political transformations that wipe away traditional configurations 
of political control.  In the imaginative society Marge Piercy depicts in her fictional portrayal of 
Firestone's social program, all power relations have been abolished.16  Piercy's protagonist in her utopian 
feminist world affirmatively values women's birth-giving powers but believes that under new 
reproductive arrangements she should relinquish this power.  In her reckoning the benefit is well worth 
the sacrifice since patriarchal power over women will have been abolished as well. 
  Firestone had a receptive following among early 1970's feminists who took feminism and 
motherhood to be incompatible (Eisenstein 1983). But soon both conceptual and substantive doubts 
surfaced.  Was such a social framework plausible, or even intelligible?  In addition to obvious difficulties 
in imagining social conditions under which the advantaged would agree to relinquish power to the 
disadvantaged, were difficulties in comprehending the radically new social roles women would have in 
such a future.  Without the mediation of a set of cultural roles and expectations, how could we know how 
to value such experiences? 
Substantive doubts centered on Firestone's principal claims: that mothering is more a barrier to 
women's self-fulfillment than a vehicle for it and that biological motherhood lies at the heart of women's 
oppression. By decade’s end the allure of a pregnancy-free future had begun to tarnish.  Feminists were 
growing increasingly receptive to the view that the capacity to nurture depends on biological as well as 
social factors (Rossi 1979).  A rapidly growing feminist literature documented the historical significance 
of mothering in women's experience and the potential of technological intrusion to exploit women's 
capacities.  Contributing to the waning of feminist enthusiasm for Firestone's views was a growing 
suspicion of advanced technology, particularly among grassroots feminists who recognized how 
technology had been used historically to reinforce male dominance (Jaggar 1983).  To activist feminists, 
particularly, It seemed implausible that women could take control of technology and use it to advance 
their own ends.  Some pressed this point even further, arguing that a technology-based reproductive 
system would not equalize the natural reproductive power structure but invert it.  Men could appropriate 
the reproductive power of women and, thereby achieve liberation from dependency on women to 
propagate. (Al-Hibri 1984). 
Though Firestone's endorsement of technological reproduction as "a victory over nature" was 
meant to serve feminist interests, a subsequent generation viewed its conceptual underpinnings as 
antithetical to feminist goals.  Endorsement of technological reproduction as the solution to dependence 
on nature aroused anxieties similar to those motivating conservatives such as Paul Ramsey and Leon Kass 
who argued that unbridled technological intervention would concentrate power and control in the hands of 
researchers and special interests.  Ramsey's attention to relationships between power over nature and 
power over humans foreshadowed mounting feminist apprehension about technological transformation of 
procreative practices.  I now turn to more comprehensive discussion of feminist critiques of the 
technologies that featured in debates during the 1980s and shaped the context of successive feminist 
appraisals of technological innovations. 
 
Second Generation Feminist Critiques 
As the British parliamentary debates illustrate (Chapter Two), controversies about the social 
meanings of ART in the media and legislatures tends to ignore gender-specific concerns or distort 
feminist criticisms to advance other ideological agendas.  Misperception of feminist viewpoints emanates 
from many sources.  Prominent among them is a false equation of a few voices with the views of all 
feminists, as if they constituted a homogenous group. This compression of perspectives feeds on two 
erroneous presumptions: that "woman's experience" can be known without regard to differences in social 
                                                            
16 Both Piercy's: Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) and Joanna Russ's: The Female Male (1975) borrow their 
central themes from Firestone's proposal though they treated this theme from different perspectives.  See Little 2007 
for a more comprehensive analysis of this genre including selections from noted science fiction writers and a 
recommended reading list of both utopian and dystopian fiction.  
  8 
or economic position and that formal identity as a woman is sufficient to forge a unified force for action.  
Reaction to such erroneous presuppositions spurred an extensive feminist literature addressing the themes 
of difference and identity.  In time, treatment of these themes came to be modified too.  A tentative 
consensus emerged recognizing that women’s identities are not likely to fit readily into discrete racial, 
ethic, class, or historical groupings but are influenced by many factors that intersect historically specific 
groups.  This conceptual modification was accompanied by a growing realization that overemphasis on 
group difference fragments feminism and defeats efforts to build solidarity and forge coalitions around 
mutually advantageous programs.17 
These developments in feminist theory influenced debate about new modes of reproduction.  
Before moving on to detailed discussion of feminist controversy about the significance of reproductive 
innovations, it is important to keep in mind commonalities shared by feminists that override differences in 
theoretical orientation and social position.  First, preoccupation with the moral status of the early embryo 
that has figured so prominently in debates about fertility technologies among conservatives and legislative 
bodies has not been a focal point of feminist discourses. To the contrary, construction of the embryo as an 
independently existing entity has been widely challenged by feminists despite their differences.  
Personhood is understood not so much as a metaphysical category assigned to beings on the basis of 
biological criteria but a relational attribute imbedded in social life.  Most feminists would applaud 
Rosalind Petchesky's plea to reconceptualize the fetus, placing it back in the uterus, the uterus back in the 
woman's body, and her body back in social space (1987).  Feminists stress the embryo’s dependence on 
the woman carrying it and its continually changing relation to her as her bodily subjectivity alters 
(Mackenzie 1992, Mullin 2005).  Second, in response to popular representations of infertility that 
emphasize the valued service fertility clinics perform in enabling women to fulfill their biological destiny, 
feminist analyses show how the market for these techniques is socially constructed.  Accounts emphasize 
the dangers to women from the more enticing forms of social control that draw women into fertility 
clinics.  Many call attention to the tendency to frame infertility as a problem located within the individual 
woman.  They point out how the stigma of this self-identification debases women by imposing on them a 
sense of personal deficiency. Third, many feminists decry “the commerce of conception,” self-serving 
alliances between medical authorities and commercial interests that are manifested in routine use of 
hyperovulatory drugs, marketing strategies of drug companies and fertility clinics, gamete procurement, 
and the practice of contract pregnancy (Spar 2006). 
Feminists disagree, however, about the extent to which the institutionalization of these 
technologies has a generalized capacity to affect women's social standing. They disagree, too, about the 
extent and justification for restricting the range of options available to individual women out of concern 
for women collectively. Feminists are deeply divided about the social significance of maternity and 
relations between women's birth-giving powers and institutions and practices that shape gender structures 
across multiple axes including race and class.  Their differing approaches to relationships among nature, 
technology and medical power are linked to theoretical and practical disagreements.  Conflicting social 
identities and analyses of power relations compound difficultly in framing a coordinated response either 
to the burgeoning fertility industry or to regulatory policy proposals.  Differing philosophical, political, 
and disciplinary orientations have both enriched feminist discourse and contributed to its complexity.   
Here I adopt an approach that considers feminist perspectives historically.  I discuss the first 
group to organize a collective response to the medicalization of infertility. Their critique was initially the 
most influential in shaping public perceptions of feminist views.  Though their attempts to set policy met 
with little success, many of their criticisms of the fertility industry are still widely shared (though not their 
theoretical assumptions or specific policy proposals). Then I turn to responses to this group by feminists 
                                                            
17 Chandra Mohanty points out the need to reconceptualize differences so they can be historically specified and 
viewed within larger political processes and systems (2003). bell hooks (1990) and Donna Haraway (1996) 
emphasize a politics built around coalitions rather than externally imposed groupings.  Naomi Zack offers a “third 
wave” historically grounded conception of likenesses among women that purportedly transcend their differences 
(2005), and Nancy Fraser articulates a program for a third wave that is sensitive to globalizing influences (2007). 
See later chapters for fuller development of feminist alternatives to gender-based politics. 
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who approach fertility issues from other theoretical and practical orientations.  Finally, I focus on themes 
that have grown increasingly prominent in the years since the first group’s influence diminished.18 
The Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 
(FINRRAGE) was created in the early1980s to mount resistance to “heterosexist global patriarchy.”19  
Members scoured the medical literature and the popular press for evidence of the exploitation of women 
patients. They stimulated empirical critiques of fertility therapies and focused attention on the 
perspectives of dissatisfied former patients. They published one of the first feminist anthologies 
addressing the new technologies (Arditti, 1984),20 initiated international conferences, testified before 
legislative committees, and maintained an awesome schedule of publication.21  Their contribution to 
empirical research has been widely acknowledged.  Their rhetorical goading and prodding has been 
instrumental in stimulating further criticism of clinical practices. 
The FINRRAGE program rested on (what its adherents characterized as) a radical analysis of 
women's oppression (Rowland 1993).  The dissemination of these technologies, they insist, reinforces that 
oppression, giving scientific and therapeutic support to the patriarchal presumption that reproduction is 
women's prime commodity.  Their program called for suppressing the development and application of 
fertility technologies.  FINRRAGEers emphasize the unwarranted risk women undergo and their 
unwittingly exploitation through the use of therapies that have never been adequately tested. They stress 
the extent to which organized medicine has already compromised women's reproductive health through 
increasing medicalization of childbirth, the deleterious side-effects of intra-uterine devices and hormonal 
contraceptives, the likely long term side-effects of ovarian stimulation drugs, and the intervention of 
reproductive endocrinologists who impose a mechanical regimen over the most minute aspects of 
women's personal lives. 
According to a leading spokeswomen for FINRRAGE: surrogate mothers are akin to prostitutes, 
scientists and doctors are the new pimps, and the desires of women who seek out  infertility treatment do 
not need be reckoned with for, within the reigning system of male supremacy, these women have allowed 
themselves to be defined and used as a “sex class.”  In so doing they have foregone their individuality.  
"This individual woman is a fiction, as is her will" (Corea 1985, 228).22  Their sex-class analysis of power 
relations stems from Shulamith Firestone’s contention that women, by virtue of their sex, constitute an 
economic class in the same sense as the workers in Marxist theory. According to FINRRAGE supporters, 
both surrogacy and prostitution exemplify the appropriation not only of women's bodies but of their wills, 
too. Collective resistance or individual renunciation are the only escape routes.  So if women cannot 
reproduce "naturally," then they should refrain from reproducing at all.23  Submission to technological 
                                                            
18 This group’s understanding of radical feminism has been widely influential in other areas of feminism.  Note, for 
instance, Kathleen Barry’s Female Sexual Slavery 1979 which incorporates their claim that all women constitute a 
common social group into a case for a global feminist culture (on this point see Jaggar 2002). 
 
19 For a review of the FINRRAGE perspective by one of its founders see Renate Klein’s “Globalized Bodies in the 
Twenty-first Century: The Final Patriarchal Takeover?” (2001). 
 
20 Their initial volume was preceded by another provocative critique of new reproductive technologies that provides 
a more balanced perspective (Holmes 1981). 
 
21  In addition to the volume cited above see, Corea 1985 and 1987), Spallone 1989, Rowland 1992, and Raymond 
1993.  They also inaugurated a journal: Issues in Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (IRAGE) which appeared 
regularly between 1988 and 1992 and then ceased publication. Their organization is still active in Australia. 
22 Corea is quoting (approvingly) from Andrea Dworkin's 1983 book, Right Wing Women.  Catherine MacKinnon 
amplified the sex-class analysis in her 1987 and 1989 books. MacKinnon and Dworkin contended that a monolithic 
patriarchal order assigns women to a predetermined status, role and function within which their bodies are a prime 
commodity. 
  
23 See, for instance, Klein (1987, 65). This emphasis has led to categorization of their position as “radical,” 
implicitly contrasting it with other feminist approaches including liberal and postmodern frameworks.  This group 
adopts this topology themselves in Rowland (1993) and Bell and Klein (1996).  Though it fits their sex-class 
analysis of the sources of women's oppression, it is confusing like so many other topologies that attempt to classify 
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remedies is a kind of defilement analogous to the sense of degradation prominent in popular and religious 
representations of prostitution.  Over this image of the violated bodies of women at the hands of the 
medical "egg snatchers" they superimpose another portrait of women reduced to the status of "cows" by a 
technology suited only to animal husbandry.24 
Robyn Rowland, a prominent member of the group, acknowledges that "the plight of infertile 
women clearly demands attention," but she urges infertile women to forego the use of these technologies 
for the sake of "women as a social group" (1987, 1992).25 Infertile women who pursue medical remedies 
are not making a genuine choice, Rowland and her collaborators insist, for the technologies do not really 
advance their interests, but dehumanize women and transfer control into the hands of the medical 
establishment which needs infertile women to further their own professional and economic goals.  Rather 
than concentrating resources on treating patients affected by the symptoms of infertility, they call for 
redirecting efforts toward investigating and controlling the environmental and iatrogenic causes of 
infertility. They point to the sizable number of children already awaiting adoption who are passed over by 
infertile couples unwilling to settle for a child who is not tied to them biologically. They fear that the 
availability of these techniques will generate an imperative for their use, making it increasingly difficult 
for women to refuse undesired bodily invasions.  Coercion may extend beyond pregnant women to 
childless women who choose not to bear children or prefer to cope with infertility problems without 
medical intervention. They fear the conflation of childlessness with infertility and its depiction as an 
affliction.26 
 
Responses to the Radical Perspective 
Despite this group's empirical claims about infertility patients, many women actually exercise 
considerable determination to seek out fertility clinics and locate physicians with a reputation for the most 
aggressive interventions (Pfeffer 1985, Gerson 1989, Bartholet 1993, Fleming 1994, Harwood 2007).  
Some continue to pursue invasive treatment even after learning that the prospects of success are slim, 
even by medically accepted standards.27  These women obviously do not perceive themselves as 
powerless victims.  Their proponents challenge the position of those who would deny them access to 
assisted reproduction.28  Gerson makes this point particularly forcefully: women who use fertility services 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
feminist political orientations.  For instance, in Firestone’s sex-class analysis technological reproduction is part of 
the solution rather than the problem.  I explore this issue more fully in chapter eight. 
 
24 The rhetorical style that compares women who use these technologies to barnyard animals was established by 
Gena Corea in her 1985 book The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to 
Artificial Wombs, New York: Harper & Row, and subsequently adopted by other members of the group. It is ironic 
that feminists should utilize a form of imagery reminiscent of masculinist debasement of women. The effort of 
ecological feminists to dislodge hierarchical views of nature that elevate human animals at the expense of other 
forms of animal life further compounds the irony.  An analogous strategy has been employed to bestialize war 
prisoners, particularly during the second Iraq war (see Butler 2004, 77-79).  
   
25 The view that all women constitute a single social group is a dominant theme in the writings of FINRRAGE 
supporters.  See Klein 2001. 
  
26 Nancy Lublin’s book, Pandora’s Box (1998) includes a more detailed account of this group’s perspective as well 
as cogent criticism from an activist viewpoint. 
27 An extensive literature emerged in the 1990s addressing the personal experiences of women who undergo fertility 
interventions.  See, for instance, Fleming (1994), Hanson (1994), May (1995), and Menzies (1993). Note also 
Elizabeth Bartholet's account of her own ten-year "obsession" with fertility programs (1993, chapter 9). Also 
relevant is the phenomenon known as “reproductive tourism.”  For as countries regulate fertility services, women 
who are denied a particular service in their home country frequently go abroad. See Chapter Nine. 
 
28 Judith Lasker and Susan Borg (1987) interviewed infertile women members of RESOLVE, a support group for 
infertile women that is sponsored by EMD Serono, one of the leading manufacturers of hyperovulatory drugs.  
RESOLVE has not been alone in advocating for infertile women.  Berg faults feminists for their "unfeeling 
attitudes" toward women’s desires for biological children and she interprets this attitude as an endorsement of 
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are not the manipulated victims of medical power that some feminists make them out to be but are 
deliberately striving to enhance their own social power. They are not deluded, she insists, but their 
interests and needs happen to mesh with the interests of medical providers.  Each needs the other in order 
to advance particular life projects.   
Those who adopt this view deny the claim that women's collective interests require individual 
women to forego the use of reproductive innovations..  Some admit that resources would be better spent 
seeking out the causes of infertility and finding safer contraceptives, but they do not see why pursuit of 
these social aims should require them to sacrifice their own personal interests.  To the suggestion that they 
should adopt instead, that there are many nonwhite and disabled children available who they could 
benefit, advocates for infertile women reply: it is unjust to demand of the infertile "because of their 
biological handicap...who have already suffered social stigma and personal loss...to bear these important 
burdens more than others" (Lasker and Borg 1987,190-191).29  From this perspective feminists who call 
for a ban either do not understand the intensity of a desire that these infertile women find perfectly natural 
and spontaneous or they misunderstand the motives of those who seek medical assistance to conceive.  
Unqualified opposition to assisted reproduction, these proponents insist, sacrifices the present interests of 
infertile women for the sake of some dubious future benefit to women collectively.  It polarizes debate 
foreclosing intermediate positions that would support effective regulation of services and insurance 
coverage for fertility treatment. 
Though the case made on behalf of involuntarily infertile women evokes compassion for those 
who find themselves caught between social stigma and medical intervention, it addresses only one 
dimension of the radical critique leaving several others untouched. The radical assessment is also 
important for other reasons.  It has made a significant contribution to feminist analysis by stressing the 
political character of the technologies and the ways social relations are woven into their fabric. In this 
respect it provides a needed antidote to the individualistic perspective often employed by advocates for 
infertile women. Others, however, have questioned the universalistic assumptions about the sources of 
women’s oppression embedded in this version of the radical view.  Admittedly, all feminists, and many 
nonfeminists would welcome the collapse of patriarchal forms of social organization.  However, such 
structures are bound up with interlocking oppressions and other patterns of social stratification that affect 
many more profoundly than gender alone (e.g. race, ethnicity, and economic position).30  Moreover, 
oppressions are not always as transparent as the radical view assumes. Generations of women have grown 
up thinking they were the equal of men only to discover retrospectively that they were still regarded as 
profoundly unequal.31  And though men are free of modes of oppression tied to childbearing potential, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
patriarchal symbols of achievement (1995, 85).  For a largely sympathetic description and evaluation of RESOLVE 
by an academic philosopher see Harwood 2007. 
 
29 This viewpoint is not endorsed by Lasker and Borg, but only reported as the view of some women they 
interviewed.  Phyllis Chesler (1988, note 31, 210) points out that there are other reasons why whites seldom adopt 
black children. The National Association of Black Social Workers has vehemently opposed interracial adoption 
(http//:www.nabsw.org); no further statement is available. They argue that black youth have a right to their own 
cultural heritage.  This view has become the policy of adoption agencies in some localities.  However, Chesler notes 
that black children constitute 37% of those waiting for adoption which is over 2.5 times their proportion in the 
population; overall, children of color waiting for adoption are a disproportionate percentage of the total. See 
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6674-children-in-foster-care-waiting-for-adoption-by-race-and-hispanic-
origin?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/868,867,133,38,35/2638,2601,2600,2598,2603,2597,2602,1353/13723,13
724.  The case for the adoption of black children by white adopters instead could be viewed as a contribution to the 
political struggle against racism and poverty.  Dorothy Roberts supports this interpretation 1997, Ch. 6.  This issue 
has become a focus of national controversy.  Some legal theorists including Bartholet (1993) argue that such policies 
deny equal opportunity to black children.  They press for an adoption policy that makes no distinction on the basis of 
race.  For further discussion of moral dimensions of this issue note Smith 1996, Roberts 1997, Shanley 2001, 
Haslanger and Witt, ed. 2005, particularly Hogg-Davis, 247-264 on racial randomization in adoption. 
30  Sociologists use the term “stratified reproduction” in a somewhat more technical sense than I but my usage is 
congruent with theirs.  See Part II of Ginsburg and Rapp for an elaboration of their usage (1995). 
 
31 I owe this observation to Sandra Bartky’s remark during a conversation about feminist consciousness.  It’s taken 
hard work, she notes, to uncover the inequalities that pervaded the early lives of second generation of feminists. 
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many are oppressed by other patterns of social stratification that privilege members of dominant social 
groups and disadvantage others.  So most feminists who address these issues today press for programs 
that aim to uncover and root out interlocking oppressions that impede achievement of a nonhierarchical 
social order that meets basic human needs, grants equal recognition to all, and supports each in shaping an 
autonomous life.32 
These concerns have prompted other feminists to reconceptualize fertility issues from more 
nuanced perspectives. They point to underlying subtexts operating within the radical critique such as 
objectification of involuntarily infertile women, naturalizing constructions of motherhood, hostility to 
technology, and an overly simplistic conception of power relations.  Their critiques draw on a rich body 
of theoretical work pertaining to reclamation of women's agency, revaluation of mothering, interrogation 
of modes of social stratification, and reappraisal of power relations. This work is rooted in a number of 
different theoretical perspectives that have influenced feminists including Continental feminist theory, 
postmodern theories, liberal and socialist versions of feminism, and care theory.  In the balance of this 
chapter I consider the themes that feature prominently in alternative feminist appraisals of the 
technologies, alluding occasionally to theoretical frameworks that guide differing approaches to these 
themes. 
 
Reclaiming Women’s Agency  
Both those who call for a ban on fertility services and those who seek their expansion frame their 
views oppositionally.  Supporters of technological remedies claim that failure to satisfy the biologically 
given desire for a child leads to an unfulfilled life.  Opponents deny that technological treatment for 
infertility can ever count as an exercise of personal choice but is invariably evidence of cultural 
conditioning.  Spokespersons for both groups assume that there is a direct unmediated relation between 
one's inborn nature or social position as a woman and a specific course of practical action.  Underlying 
both viewpoints are presumptions that compel more nuanced appraisal. 
The view that stresses the pervasive influence of cultural conditioning tie agency to an idealized 
norm of a competent decision-maker who has shaken off all cultural norms  Actual  decision-makers 
rarely conform to that ideal. Consider, for instance, women who become pregnant spontaneously--or, at 
least, without medical intervention.  Pregnancy, for some, is occasion for rejoicing even though they may 
not have made a conscious decision.  Others who consider abortion and reject that option are more likely 
to say they ‘decided’ to become pregnant.  But as Berg (1995) points out, because infertile women face 
more obstacles to pregnancy, they are likely to have given more thought to becoming biological mothers 
than those who conceive spontaneously.33 Of course, deliberate deciders will have planned their 
pregnancies around competing commitments.  But even they are unlikely to be fully aware of cultural 
norms that influence their decision or its full implications.  Assuming that a decision to become pregnant 
can, indeed, be fully voluntary and informed, one still cannot ‘choose’ the particular child conceived.34  
Genetic, intrauterine, and childbirth technologies may eventually reduce uncertainties surrounding birth, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
32  Numerous qualifications, provisos, and explanations would be needed to spell out these generalizations.  The 
social program advocated by Firestone and other 1970s feminists have been largely supplanted by more complex 
analyses of the political structures bound up with social organization. Note, for instance the essays in Part Two of 
Ginsburg and Rapp on social stratification (1995). These essays show how reproductive norms and the practices in 
which they’re embodied are influenced, not only by gender, but by class, sexual orientation, race, and age as well.  
Feminists who formerly offered a patriarchal analysis of gender oppression have now been influenced (to varying 
degrees) by the other feminist perspectives I discuss here. 
33 Unlike some radical feminists, I am not assuming that a determination not to have children is any more or less 
voluntary than a decision to have them.  Both are influenced by socially constructed social norms and attitudes. On 
strategies to overcome such cultural conditioning see Meyers “The Rush to Motherhood: Pronatalist Discourses and 
Women’s Autonomy” in her 2002 book.  For an insightful critique of the kind of voluntarism that seems to infect the 
radical position see Bartky 1990. Ch. 4.  I return to this theme in Chapter Six. 
 
34  Parents who utilize IVF can now selectively choose the child’s sex and a few other attributes via PGD or other 
technologies.  I discuss prenatal trait selection in Chapter Six.   
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but child rearing is bound to present unanticipated surprises. The intervention of reproductive experts 
adds further complexity to these dynamics.  They must be deliberately sought out.  The alternatives they 
offer have already been structured by social and medical institutions that tilt the balance toward higher 
success rates and increased profitability.35  Thus their authority is likely to add additional weight to the 
quest for a child. Hence even under the best of circumstances cultural norms and unforeseen experiences 
circumscribe individual preferences. 
A more nuanced approach would take into account both the subjectivity of individual women 
(those who forego treatment as well as those undergoing it) and the structural framework that shapes their 
options.  It would direct attention to the pervasive tendency to objectify the patient under treatment and 
erase her individuality.  To counter the tendency of clinicians and researchers to refer to the woman under 
treatment as "the infertile couple," feminist critics press for approaches that acknowledge objectification 
without absolutizing its influence. McLeod makes the point that objectification is a linear concept; one 
can neither be wholly under its sway or totally free of it (2007).  Meyers argues that women should be 
encouraged to acquire autonomy skills to minimize objectifying influences (2002). 
 
Revaluing Maternity 
Needed is a reevaluation of maternity that uncovers the tacit assumptions underlying the radical 
view and acknowledges the shifting power relations that undergird maternity.  The radical appraisal of 
ART sees mothering as a kind of “natural” activity that can be isolated from political and historical 
structures.  Radical feminists often appeal to Adrienne Rich's distinction between the experience of 
mothering and the patriarchal institutions within which mothering experiences have historically been 
embedded (1976). They take natural motherhood and natural procreation to exemplify the real values of 
feminism.  In this respect the radical view shares an affinity with both the conservative ethicists I have 
discussed and cultural feminists who take women to have a natural talent for mothering that finds 
expression in a distinctive female sphere of nurturance.36  Those who embrace this perspective look to the 
relationship between mother and child as a paradigm for relations among all women once prevailing 
power structures have been transformed.  Some note a tendency on the part of those who share this 
idealized picture to see third party procreative arrangements, such as surrogacy and borrowed gametes, as 
a kind of negative mirror image, a reversal that mocks the values of “real” motherhood. The alacrity with 
which some radical feminists have invoked the metaphor of prostitution to deride women who seek 
infertility treatment lends further plausibility to this interpretation. 
Claims that mothering is natural, however, need to be viewed against the background of historical 
and social practices with which maternal-child relations are intertwined.  For experiences can never be 
plucked from a societal context.  Women undergo experience not simply as women but as members of 
many other interlocking social groups that are configured within specific historical contexts. The 
mothering experiences of impoverished African-American women, for instance, are likely to differ 
considerably from, say, middle class white women (Williams 1991, Roberts 1997).  To posit an essential 
relationship that binds together the interests of all women and defines mother-child relationships is bound 
to misconstrue and distort many women's experiences and aspirations.  Moreover, it is unlikely to open 
new directions toward understanding and transforming oppressive social relations.  
Of course, virtually all feminists give weight to the importance of pregnancy and birth in 
women's personal histories, the ways these experiences shape their lives, contribute to self 
understandings, create bonds, and build community.  But many dispute the presumption that we can know 
what a natural relation to our fertility would be like or if we did, whether we would find it desirable.37  
                                                            
35 Susan Sherwin develops this point persuasively.  See particularly her articles “Normalizing Reproductive 
Technologies and the Implications for Autonomy” 2001 and “The Importance of Ontology for Feminist Policy-
Making in Reproductive Technology” 2002.  
36 Radical feminists disavow the label “cultural feminist.”  See Tania Lienert “On Who is Calling Radical Feminists 
‘Cultural Feminists’ and Other Historical Sleights of Hand” in Bell and Klein 1996, 155-168. 
 
37 Childbed fever was less a natural accompaniment of childbirth than an artifact of medical meddling. It was not 
until the nineteenth century, though, that physicians became aware of their role in bringing infection into the birthing 
room.  In 1840 Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes in the U.S. and Dr. Ignaz Semmelweis in Austria contended that 
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Dion Farquhar speaks of this presumption as “a romantic reduction that ignores the diversity of 
constraints on the historical record” (1996, 99).  Cultures inevitably put their mark on such central life 
experiences as gestation and childbirth, shaping their meanings and integrating them into distinctive 
networks of social practices and expectations.  Evidence suggests that women in virtually every culture 
have tried to time and control their pregnancies.   
Even more troubling than tendencies to essentialize natural mothering or demonize technology is 
the hold these binary constructions wield over the pursuit of further inquiry that could otherwise critically 
examine the social contexts that frame these technologies. The crucial issue, Judy Wajcman points out, “is 
not what childbirth was or would look like for women without the controls imposed by modern 
technology, but why the technologies we have take the form they do.” (1991,69).  Her remark points to a 
crucial weakness in the tendency to organize debate around the naturalness or artificiality of particular 
technologies; a tendency to unthinkingly replicate polarities that constructed women as the dominated sex 
originally, particularly the identification of technology with maleness and nature with the female. This 
tendency is evident in metaphors prevalent in discourses that portray technology as a disruptive force 
casting asunder an original natural order. They often liken women who use these techniques to barnyard 
animals and breeding machines. By demonizing technology these approaches fail to loosen the hold of 
dualistic constructions of the world and divert attention from efforts to understand and change material 
conditions and relations that dominate infertility research and treatment.  Appeal to either nature or social 
construction as ultimate determinants of human desires forecloses inquiry, often before the most 
compelling questions have been broached.  
Though all but the most rudimentary desires betray evidence of social fabrication, it is seldom 
evident how their construction can be so adroitly concealed that these desires seem natural and self-
evident to those experiencing them.  Popular narratives that present infertility treatment as a romantic 
adventure undoubtedly play a role in shaping the consciousness of those who seek these services.  
Counter-narratives can break that spell. But even narratives that acknowledge the risks and sacrifices 
inherent in infertility treatment are often presented in account that elevates sacrifice to a moral virtue. The 
voices of women who use infertility services need to be heard, of course, but measures also need to be 
taken to protect their interests and assist them when it is in their interest to resist the lure of the for-profit 
fertility industry.38 
 
Patterns of Social Stratification 
The reduction of all infertile women to membership in a common group also disregards the 
particular needs of individuals and conceals the social inequities that propel women selectively into these 
clinics.  Missing from these accounts is recognition of either the social power these women seek or 
inequalities between their position and the medical providers the consult.  The privileges of social class 
and gender status may be invisible to many of them individually, but may still play a major role in 
bringing them to fertility clinics.  Susan Sherwin points to underlying connections between pressures that 
attract some women to fertility clinics and exclusionary practices that bar others and deny access to 
women who lack the economic means.  She notes that: "IVF may be accurately described as a technique 
that is available to men who are judged worthy, even though it is carried out on their wives" (1992, 
127).39  Others point out the extent to which husbands of women subjected to these interventions often 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
physicians carried infection from patient to patient and urged cleansing the hands to prevent transportation of the 
infection.  For a detailed account of this episode in the history of childbearing see Leavitt 1986. 
38 Several feminist sociologists including Judith Lorber (1992) have done exemplary work ferreting out the 
motivations of women who populate fertility clinics.  The FINRRAGE group has collected interviews with women 
who have used these services. Critiques are often illustrated with anecdotes about women who have used these 
facilities, e.g. Spar 2006. Individual women have also published personal reflections of their experiences with third 
party procreation (see, for instance, Kane 1988, Menzies 1993, Fleming 1994, Hanson 1994, Berg 1995, May 1995, 
and Blood 2005). Fertility clinics also publish data on patient satisfaction.  Such accounts need to be read within the 
context of the background assumptions guiding them and should be supplemented by controlled trials. Oakley, 
among others, has pressed for research designs that yield more generalizable information (1995). 
 
39 At the time of Sherwin’s writing lesbian and single women were usually rejected too.  This practice has changed 
in recent years, but economic circumstances still shut out many of these women. 
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play a dominant role in deciding among alternative solutions to fertility problems.  In Lasker and Borg’s 
survey of members of the advocacy organization RESOLVE, men resisted the idea of adoption far more 
often than women (1987, 1989). Their wives' willingness to endure medical treatment was motivated 
more by a desire to do this "for their husbands" than by their own preferences.  Advances in techniques 
further complicate this picture.  It is now possible to provide assisted reproduction in instances where the 
male partner is known to be HIV positive or has a very low sperm count. This technique, intra-cyclic 
sperm injection (ICSI), also requires his fertile female partner to undergo IVF which exposes her to the 
risks of ovarian stimulation and retrieval (Sauer 2003).40   
In Judith Lorber’s words women undergoing such invasive treatments for their partner’s sake are 
making a "patriarchal bargain" (1992).  Viewed from this perspective, disparities in power relations 
among women, their husbands, and medical practitioners all call for further scrutiny.  The social power of 
women presumed by supporters of fertility treatment may be at least partially illusory.  Were their 
marriages to dissolve their power might collapse too.  The semblance of equality between provider and 
patient may be illusory too.  For typically, they don’t meet as equals.  Considering pronatalist social 
pressures, customary consent procedures afford little protection against the power wielded by 
institutionalized medicine and the pharmaceutical industry. As Susan Sherwin observes: “(t)he burden of 
proof in decision making about participating in such technologies often rests with those who contemplate 
declining them rather than with those seeking access (2001,09).  Further, in the absence of comprehensive 
governmental oversight the patient lacks assurance that even her immediate interests will be well served. 
She is no match for the authority of providers to advance institutional interests.  As Debora Spar observes, 
“the people who purchase fertility services don’t see themselves as participating in a commercial 
relationship” (2006, 49).  Hence even after years of frustrating treatment they rarely explore alternative 
options.  Given the pronatalist atmosphere surrounding ART and the mystique and authority of those who 
administer it, patient consent to treatment may be more a reflection of social norms and the modes of 
stratification embedded in those norms than an autonomous personal choice (Ryan 2009).  Feminist 
critics of the rhetoric of choice are inclined to see consent procedures as a subtle form of social control.41    
To the hazards of high-tech infertility intervention must be added the risks of low-tech methods 
of bodily surveillance.42  Gender-specific regulatory strategies that advance a pronatalist agenda need not 
require very sophisticated technological equipment. The regulation of sexual activity by medical experts 
and daily temperature readings may restrict women’s agency and curtail their autonomy more stealthily 
than invasive techniques.  Women who have been instructed by their physicians to monitor their bodily 
temperatures may not be aware of changes in their self-perception.  Accustomed to following the advice 
of experts, they may view compliance with medically prescribed direction as voluntary.  Low-tech 
methods may seem benign but they can be imposed very broadly on women trying to avoid pregnancy as 
well as those seeking to achieve it.  Self-surveillance accustoms women to see themselves from a medical 
observer's vantage point as potential reproducers who police their own reproductive processes with 
detachment.  
Their male partners who are directed to produce sperm for artificial insemination also experience 
some objectification, but practitioners (mostly male) are likely to accommodate their preferences more 
readily.43 Clinics often allow a sperm sample to be brought from home and later delivered to the clinic. 
Constraints on sexual activity during fertility treatment also tend to affect the sensibilities of partners 
differently depending on social meanings that converge around male and female sexuality and their 
resonance behind the walls of medical consulting rooms.  The project of achieving pregnancy is likely to 
affect a woman’s self-identity more centrally than her partner's.  For women commonly spend more time 
                                                            
40 Sauer’s article is followed by a group of commentaries that critically examine the morality of the technique from 
the standpoint of both the women involved and the future child.  Since his writing, sperm injection techniques have 
expanded and are now often used even when the male sperm count is not extraordinarily low.  
 
41 Barbara Katz Rothman, in particular, has argued for this position in several of her books and reiterated it at a 2008 
conference in New York City sponsored by Bioethics International and the Appignani Center for Bioethics. 
  
42 Note Linda Singer's remarks on maximizing women's social utility as breeders, 1992, particularly 114. 
 
43 See, for instance, Paul Lauritzen's discussion of his own experience, 1993. 
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under the scrutiny of medical practitioners and their reproductive capacities tend to be more integral to 
their sense of self.44 
Feminists are now increasingly supporting a broader understanding of social relations that 
facilitates a more probing appraisal of the social institutions and practices that confer so much power on a 
select few.  They ask: who benefits from prevailing modes of social stratification such as class-selective 
pronatalist policies, the consolidation of control in the hands of “experts,” and professional women’s 
withdrawal from the workforce?  Such enquiries have the potential to challenge the identity pronatalist 
policies mark on women and expose  popular representations of infertility that confer identities, such as 
“infertile women” or “unfit mothers,” making women more susceptible to institutional control.  
Responses must be formulated so as not to stigmatize vulnerable women even further.  Taking into 
account the broader political and social contexts within which reproduction is embedded, it is important to 
preserve a perspective that does not isolate the quest for a child from considerations of justice and 
fairness, and holds together both the generalized requirements of justice owed to all and concrete 
considerations of care and concern due each. In the concluding section of this chapter I consider in more 
detail power relationships that intervene between the agency of individual women and the social contexts 
that frame their choices. 
 
Reappraising Power Relations 
An enduring strength of the radical perspective is its recognition that technologies are not 
politically neutral instruments, that political choices are already woven into the fabric of the technologies 
that find their way to market.  But this acknowledgment need not demonize technology or set it in 
opposition to nature.  Nor does it compel the conclusion that technologies are autonomous, that they 
cannot be redirected to uses other than those envisaged by their developers.  This recognition serves, 
instead, as a reminder that the workings of a particular technology cannot all be foreordained and 
circumscribed.  Its implementation will change the experience of its users.  The technology may have 
liberatory or repressive applications never envisaged by those who devised it.  To expand options 
available to users and protect them from probable harm, technology assessment needs to be initiated 
during their developmental phase.45  Ruth Schwartz Cowan (1992) points out several stages in the 
development and marketing of a technology where the intentions of those who devise it may be diverted 
to other ends.  Their motives may be altered to fit other agendas, the purposes of those who sell the 
technology may deviate from objectives embedded within the technological system, and the technology 
itself may have unintended consequences. Examples abound. Chorionic villa sampling and amniocentesis 
have been diverted from diagnosis of genetic disorders to sex preselection.  Birth control technologies 
were initially directed to women of the underclass who were perceived to be reproducing excessively. 
They were then appropriated by middle class women to reduce their fecundity. The contraceptive pill, 
introduced as a universal, context-independent contraceptive, turned out to be highly culture-specific.  It 
required a user able to exercise discipline in taking medications routinely, with ready access to 
gynecological exams, and a partner from whom she did not have to hide her contraceptive use 
(Oudshoorn 1993). 
Technologies to circumvent infertility also lend themselves to varied aims. Too exclusive a focus 
on the technological powers of medical researchers and the pharmaceutical industry may exaggerate their 
influence and neglect the ease with which a technology designed to serve the procreative interests of 
consumers and the economic interests of the fertility industry may be  
                                                            
44 Of course the reproductive capacities of all women but pronatalist discourse and practices are likely to have this 
effect on many. See, for instance, Ann Oakley’s discussion of the influence of visualizing techniques on the self-
perception of pregnant women 1984,155-186, Squire 1994, and Stable’s “Shooting the Mother” 1998. Also, on the 
influence of pronatalist discourse on women’s autonomy and self-identity see Meyers 2002, 30-57. 
 
45 LP: But society is going in the other direction: consider the US Congress’ defunding of the Office of Technology 
Assessment. 
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diverted either to liberatory aims or to a more insidious exercise of disciplinary power.46  In the 1980s the 
radical feminist movement looked to the state as an ally to advance an agenda favoring the interests of 
some child-free women over those who depend on technological innovations to enhance their fertility.  In 
some instances they advocated statutory remedies for reproductive practices they found objectionable 
(e.g. surrogacy).  But their trust in government power did not fit harmoniously with their unremitting 
distrust of medical power. Their anti-natalist bias overrode their interest in supporting legislation to 
protect the well-being of women seeking infertility services.47 
I do not mean to imply that the legislative route should always be spurned. To the contrary, as 
Debora Spar has shown, much more stringent regulation needs to be put in place in the U.S.  to safeguard 
the health and well-being of women who use assisted reproduction services (2006).  But strategies need to 
be tailored carefully to surrounding conditions.  Under some circumstances the state may be a effective 
ally, reigning in the excesses of the fertility industry by insuring truth in advertising, full disclosure of 
medical information, safe and effective therapies, and standardized laboratory procedures.  Wariness is 
needed, however, lest the state unduly constrict options.  No hard and fast boundary marks the difference 
between the benign use of state power to protect consumer interests and malicious intrusion into women's 
reproductive choices.  Efforts by the U.S. federal government to obtain the names of women who have 
had legal second trimester abortions illustrate a use of governmental power to intimidate women whose 
conduct does not fit favored norms.48 
Government mandated pronatalist programs illustrate another use of government power that 
requires little technological sophistication.  Neither the horrors women suffered in Ceausescu's Romania 
nor the fictional nightmare so vividly portrayed in Margaret Atwood's novel The Handmaid's Tale (1986) 
required much technological apparatus.  Vital to the capacity of the Romanian regime to enforce its policy 
was its power to withhold a contraceptive technology readily available in most developed countries.  In 
Atwood's fictional account a patriarchal pronatalist totalitarian regime is able to seize political control and 
establish a noncash economy.  In one stroke, they close all women’s bank accounts, thereby causing them 
to be totally dependent on men for subsistence. The regime is then able to carry out its reproductive 
policy by “natural” means alone. They don’t even need low-tech methods of artificial insemination.  The 
few remaining fertile women are conscripted to serve as “handmaids" to breed offspring for an all-
powerful ruling class.  Through a ritualized form of sexual intercourse bordering on rape (the women who 
serve as the receptacle are denied the power to refuse) they eliminate the need to employ any 
technological innovations.  The society Atwood constructs imaginatively is far less technologically 
sophisticated than contemporary societies. 
Atwood's scenario also raises questions about the seeming naturalness of ‘natural’ procreation.  It 
illustrates how specific social arrangements bend the meaning of procreative experiences, transforming 
what seems natural to what is obviously a social artifact. The political impulses underlying the radical 
                                                            
46 Michel Foucault has written extensively about the diffusion of power among authorities in modern society. His 
conception of biopolitics has ready application to the power of medical authorities to impose disciplinary practices 
that influence people's self-perception and increase their compliance with medical authority. The practices he 
describes are readily extendable to the process whereby a female body is turned into an appropriately feminine one 
(Discipline and Punish 1979, 222).  For a general interpretation of the significance of Foucault’s work for women's 
self-identity, see Bartky "Foucault, Feminism, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power" in her 1990 collection 
Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press) and other pieces in her 
2002 work.  Note also Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault (Routledge, 1991). 
 
47 In the U.S. FINRRAGE supporters often appeared before state legislatures considering regulation of contract 
pregnancy.  For the testimony of Gena Corea before the California Assembly Judiciary Committee see Gostin 1990, 
325-337).  See also the autobiography of Elizabeth Kane (1988), reputedly the first surrogate mother.  She often 
accompanied members of FINRRAGE and presented testimony about her own personal disillusionment. Under the 
rubric of the organization they founded the Institute on Women and Technology, and they countered claims to the 
safety of the abortifacient, RU-486. See “Some Doctors Voice Worry Over Abortion Pills’ Safety,” New York Times 
4/01/06, A11. 
 
48 This issue arose in conjunction with federal efforts to prohibit so called ‘partial birth abortions,’ known in the 
medical community as "intact D&E" (dilation and extraction). 
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feminist program and conservative approaches (including Atwood’s theocracy) are diametrically opposed, 
but both wind up suppressing the development and application of fertility technologies.  Conservatives 
would like to reinstitute traditional structures of family authority and radicals want to annihilate them.  




The agency of individuals is shaped by multiple factors both within individual psyches and in 
surrounding social structures.  Achievement of social equality will depend on women’s power to define 
their own needs from their own subjective perspectives.  Medical knowledge would need to be adapted to 
the circumstances of particular patients who alone have final epistemic authority. Strategies need to be 
devised to support women's efforts to trust their own judgment, articulate their own needs, and challenge 
authoritarian constructions of them by medical professionals.  Efforts to create increasing space for 
patients to participate in treatment decisions is a vital beginning, but inadequate to fully support patient 
agency.  Ann Oakley suggests several routes for supplementing with patient-generated knowledge the 
presumably objective information provided by quantitative medical tests (1995).  Also useful toward this 
end are Sue Fisher's observations about physician-patient interaction (1986).  In her research she found 
that only when patients interrupted physician explanations and steered them to their own concerns were 
they able to elicit alternative treatment options.  Some women are inevitably better prepared to exercise 
such intervention than others.  Social, educational, and economic class influence both provider attitudes 
and patient self-assertion in the face of authority. Carolyn McLeod points out how the capacity to have 
confidence in one’s own responses in the face of medical authority depends on self-trust which must be 
fostered through collaborative relationships that allow patients to safely voice inchoate feelings and learn 
to individuate them (2002).   New conceptual tools and practical strategies need to be devised to diminish 
the regulatory power imposed on patients by medical professionals and equip women to play a more 
active part in medical encounters.  
Projects to strengthen women's subjectivity will miss their mark, however, unless they are 
attentive to the ways innovative fertility technologies are reconstructing social relations.  Though 
technologies place a direct burden only on some women, all women who are potential mothers have a 
collective interest in reproductive policy, whatever their social position.  Even child-free women are 
affected since, like many more commonly available technologies (even dishwashers, television, and 
email), their accessibility puts pressure on those who prefer to do without, to justify their preferences.  
Not even postmenopausal women are now beyond the reach of fertility techniques since science can now 
(albeit unsafely) reverse the effects of menopause.  Commercial fertility services now market their wares 
even among women in their sixties.  
  A response to reproductive innovations that aspires to gender justice must include a more 
adequate understanding of the ways gender structures are tied to expectations that women bear children 
and the differential impact these structures have on specifically situated groups.49  Population policies 
have a significant impact on the freedom of women to combine childbearing and rearing with their 
workplace lives.  Presently, in Western Europe especially, the growing proportion of those beyond 
working age is putting pressure on the working population to increase their birth rate.  At least forty-five 
countries in Europe and Asian have instituted government programs to maintain or raise their fertility 
rates.  Approaches vary considerably. All countries in the European Union require employers to allow 
women more flexibility in their working lives.  For it’s been shown that women have more children and 
begin childbearing earlier in their lives when day care is readily available to them.50  Sweden led the way 
in 1974 with the introduction of a very generous parental leave policy to lure more women into an 
understaffed workforce.  But considering the trade-offs, the situation of Swedish women is still far from 
idyllic.  Though either mother or father may claim the leave, women do so with far greater frequency than 
men, in part because pay inequities reinforce traditional gender roles.  Husbands who stay home generally 
                                                            
49 See, for example, Spelman 1988, particularly 158-159. 
 
50 See, for instance, “The Motherhood Experiment” by Sharon Lerner, New York Times Magazine, 03/04/07, 20. 
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lose more money than do their wives.  Dropping in and out of the workforce affects eligibility for 
promotions too, perpetuating and intensifying traditional gender inequities.  Nonetheless, in Sweden and 
the other Scandinavian countries child welfare services and other benefits make childbearing affordable 
enough almost to maintain the replacement level of the population (1.9).  Paradoxically, it’s traditionally 
Roman Catholic countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece that now have the lowest fertility 
rates in Western Europe.  Italy has massively cut back its child welfare benefits and the fertility rate has 
fallen precipitously from 2.4 children per woman in the early 1970s to 1.4 presently.51  Hungary and other 
Eastern European countries are losing population at comparable rates.52  At the current rate the population 
of Eastern Europe will be cut by a third by 2050.  The U.S. is barely maintaining its replacement level, 
but this level would also drop were it not for the larger families of new immigrants.  The typical female 
college graduate in the U.S. born in the mid-1960s married three years later than the comparable graduate 
born in the 1950s.  Presently, only 43 percent of U.S. women in the 25-29 age range have children under 
six compared with about 71 percent in the 1960s.53  Nonetheless, the U.S. government spends far less than 
other wealthy countries on childcare and provides no guaranteed paid parental leave.   
The conclusion is inescapable.  Fertility rates are declining most precipitously in countries that 
view family welfare primarily as an individual responsibility and still adhere to policies assuming the 
father is the primary breadwinner. Countries that offer public support for working mothers are now 
experiencing the highest birthrates (Crompton 2007).54  So obviously, social policy has a far-reaching 
impact on women's childbearing decisions. To monitor policies and insure that they uphold women’s 
freedom to make childbearing and rearing arrangements in a supportive social environment, feminist 
discourses need to link up with discourses that structure public debate.55  Alliances need to be organized 
among many groups with diverse interests.  I shall mention just three areas where gender-specific norms 
that contribute to the demand for medical remedies could be destabilized to expand the options of those 
who seek children. 
First, people seeking treatment seldom know which if any of the available medical interventions 
are likely to help them or whether a particular practitioner has the requisite expertise to provide assistance 
appropriate to their condition.  Many now turn to the internet but those resources are too often sponsored 
by special interests such as RESOLVE, a prominent support organization for infertile women, which is 
backed by a leading hyperovulatory drug manufacturer. National government agencies are increasingly 
posting IVF success rates on their websites but reporting is often voluntary and rates can be manipulated 
to draw more patients into clinics.  In some countries government regulatory bodies impose uniform 
                                                            
51 Data on fertility rates and child welfare programs in Sweden and Italy are taken from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN and “Italian Women Shun the ‘Mamma’ Role” in BBC News 
at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk. For a comparative summary of “World Population Prospects” see the UN Dept. of 
Economic and Social Affairs website: http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm.  
 
52 See UN/ECE, “Fertility decline in the transition economies, 1982-1997: political, economic and social factors,” 
Economic Survey of Europe, 1999 No. 1, pp. 181-194. For further and more recent details, see Anna Cristina 
D’Addio and Marco Mira d’Ercole, “Policies, Institutions and Fertility Rates: A Panel Analysis for OECD 
Countries,” OECD Economic Studies, No. 41, 2005/2. 
 
53 Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and New York Times 3/2/06, A1. More recent information can be 
found on the Bureau’s website.  
54 LP: ironically, this may not be a good thing overall for humanity, given the limits on the carrying capacity of the 
earth. How reconcile what’s good for individuals with what’s good for human flourishing? 
 
55 A number of factors contribute to the partiality of feminist representation in public debate.  First, distortion and 
misunderstanding arise from displacing feminist theoretical vocabularies from their original contexts and 
transposing them within discourses that have already been shaped by dominant political ideologies.  Second, the full 
range of feminist concerns cannot be squeezed into a public debate that has been narrowly constructed around the 
concerns of researchers and ideological conservatives.  Third, the token feminist invited to join policy making 
bodies cannot be presumed to represent all women who have a stake in public policy. Finally, there are inevitable 
limitations in writing about a tumultuous situation while living in its midst.  As I have already indicated, feminist 
perspectives toward the new technologies are not rigid unyielding positions so much as differing tendencies that 
shade into one another. 
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standards on clinics, but close alliances between medical organizations and government authorities dilute 
such efforts.  Tensions between the interests of medicine and government might be exploited to build 
more extensive alliances that would promote effective regulation of fertility services and secure increased 
government support for alternatives to medical intervention. Gaps between the priorities and goals of 
commercial for-profit clinics and research institutions also offer opportunities to press for more adequate 
monitoring and oversight of fertility services. 
Second, programs that encourage alternatives to the quest for a biologically related child need to 
be accelerated.  Adoption is all too often even more cumbersome, frustrating and disappointing than 
medical intervention.  Since the advent of the birth control pill in the 1960s and the legalization of 
abortion in the early 1970s, the number of children available for adoption has dropped precipitously. 
Women beyond their peak childbearing years are likely to be disqualified by adoption agencies.  Many 
who would happily adopt a child of a different race may be screened out by social workers persuaded that 
only same race families are suitable.  In many countries adoption agencies frame their policies and 
assessments against a conventional notion of motherhood.  Applicants with unconventional sexual 
orientations are routinely excluded as adoptive parents though studies of lesbian and gay parent families 
show that their children are as healthy and happy as children raised in traditional households (Golombok 
2000). 
Adoption, however, is at best only a very partial answer for those seeking children.  Sharon Rush 
has estimated that if each of the 365,000 orphans in the U.S. were adopted by the two million infertile 
‘traditional’ couples, four-fifths of these couples would still be without a child.56  Moreover, the adoption 
process replicates many of the drawbacks and risks that characterize medically assisted conception.  
Legally sanctioned adoption is subject to strict surveillance and regulation.  Extra-legal or ‘black market’ 
adoption can lead to bitter disappointment if the birth mother changes her mind and decides to keep the 
child.  ‘”Open” adoption can bind both birth parents and adopted ones in long-lasting, often demanding, 
relationships (Shanley 2003, Haslanger and Witt 2005).  International adoption, an increasingly popular 
option for those who have exhausted medical remedies for childlessness, is fraught with bureaucratic 
tangles and lengthy delays.57  Moreover, since an important motivation of those who seek out fertility 
services is the desire to keep a (genetic) part of themselves alive (Henig 2004), infertile couples seldom 
even explore adoption opportunities until they have exhausted medical options. 
Despite such contributing factors, some partially attribute demand for medical intervention to the 
dearth of other opportunities to have close enduring relationships with children. Claudia Card describes 
both the disadvantages of the prevailing situation in which the child's primary caretaker has virtually 
absolute power over a child and the advantages of alternative social arrangements that would encourage 
long-lasting meaningful relationships between young children and other adults (Card 1996). 
Finally, without neglecting efforts to uncover the causes of infertility, more attention needs to 
focus on factors that contribute to infertility.  Some, such as undiagnosed and untreated pelvic infections 
and obstetrical fistula, are more common in the global South.  Others such as early and late childbearing 
and substandard care during pregnancy and childbirth threaten women’s well-being in both developing and 
                                                            
56 Sharon Elizabeth Rush in Kindred Matters 1993, 121. More recent data indicate that approximately 100,000 
children are still waiting to be placed for adoption in the U.S.  See “Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment 
for Adoption in the United States” 1995 by A. Chankdra, et al at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs; also Haslanger and Witt 
2005, 4 on difficulties in gathering long term data on adoption. See Kathleen Kingsbury, “Longer Times Higher 
Costs for U.S. Adoptions,” Reuters, New York, 1/15/2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/15/us-adoption-
domestic-waits-idUSBRE90E15Y20130115. 
 
57 Anne Tyler’s novel Digging to America vividly dramatizes the tensions and rewards of international adoption.  
Two families meet by chance as each is meeting a newly adopted Korean infant at the airport. Their experiences are 
punctuated by surprisingly uncanny observations about cross-cultural adoption. “When your children resemble you, 
you tend to forget that they’re not you.  Much better to be reminded they’re not every time you set eyes on them” 
2006, 93. Note also “The Last Babylift” by John Seabrook on the dilemmas of international adoption in the May 10, 
2010 issue of the New Yorker (available online at newyorker.com). 
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developed economies.58  Readily accessible screening programs for the more common infectious agents 
that affect pregnant women might be established at far less cost than infertility treatment.  
Workplace strategies might also be reconfigured to overcome economic conditions that press 
women to defer childbearing beyond their peak years of fertility.  I have noted that some countries 
formally recognize the social contribution women make through childbearing (Meyers and Gornick 2003).  
But many others view childbearing as solely a personal choice and place the full burden of combined work 
and childbearing on individual families.  The persistence of an outdated career model designed for white 
men with stay at home wives puts all working women at a considerable disadvantage.  Silvia Hewlett’s 
research has shown that most highly qualified women in the U.S. do not follow the same career path as 
similarly qualified men.  Instead, they have “nonlinear careers, taking breaks from their careers to care for 
children or elders” (2007).  Women in academic life, in particular, must juggle both the biological clock 
and the tenure clock simultaneously.  With less ingenuity than is required to outmaneuver the biological 
clock, it should be possible to bring the time-frame for tenure into a more equitable balance.59  A few large 
employers have introduced flexible work and career arrangements to retain talented women. But stigma 
persists so many who qualify decline to exercise flex-time options for fear of ending up on the mommy 
track and losing out to men whose careers are seldom interrupted by family responsibilities.  Further, the 
job security and pregnancy leave that some women won during economically prosperous times tend to 
erode in a recessionary economy.60  And as national economies are integrated into an increasingly 
competitive globalized economy, fewer employers are likely to voluntarily accommodate pregnant women 
and families with newborns. The work of establishing uniform standards for job-related family relief will, 
in all likelihood, fall to already overstretched international human rights agencies. 
In suggesting practical strategies that could reduce the need for medical intervention to circumvent 
infertility, I do not mean to devalue the importance of ongoing theoretical work among feminists.  Rather, I 
am calling for renewed recognition of the impulse that guided second wave feminism: mutual interplay 
between theory and practice. I commend the measures taken by feminists to move beyond preoccupation 
with identity politics and encompass broader historical developments. Prevailing conditions require a more 
inclusive vision of the transforming work that still needs to be done. Previous phases of the feminist 
movement need to be integrated into a trans-national synthesis that is responsive to a globalizing world 
(Fraser 2007).  It is, in part, the job of theoretical analysis to shape this vision.  If the vision is too narrow, 
as are some I have critiqued, there is danger of inadvertently neglecting the needs of many, favoring the 
privileged at the expense of the marginalized, and overlooking possible strategies that could influence the 
direction of social transformation.  I turn now to related background conditions that need to be taken into 
account in developing a more inclusive orientation. 
 
Reconnecting Theory and Practice 
Feminists are increasingly recognizing that critique of reproductive practices needs to proceed in 
tandem with analysis of the conceptual underpinnings that guide practice. Women's experience in the 
sexual liberation movement of the 1960s shows the dangers of buying into an overly narrow model of 
power that defeats long-term goals.  Linda Singer’s work reminds us that the movement brought release 
                                                            
58 Obstetrical fistula is common in developing countries where cesarean section is not available to end prolonged 
labor. If blood supply to the bladder and/or rectum is cut off a hole may form through which urine and/or feces leak 
uncontrollably. Fistula victims are often abandoned by their husbands and rejected by their communities.  UNFPA 
estimates that their world population exceeds two million.  For a moving account of its effect on women see 
“Nightmare for African Women” by Sharon LaFraniere in The New York Times, 9/28/05. 
59 For literature addressing struggles to balance academic appointments and  family roles see Robin Wilson: “How 
Babies Alter Careers for Academic” in Chronicle of Higher Education 12/5/03 available at http//chronicle.com;  
Evans and Grant’s anthology Mama PhD 2004 and The APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 7:1, 2007.  
Seven women philosophers reflect on their experiences. Available at www.apa.org 
 
60 In the U.S. where anti-discrimination law is much more lax than in many other developed countries charges of 
pregnancy-based discrimination filed against the Equal Opportunity Commission  have increased fifty percent in the 
last decade and is still rising (New York Times, 3/28/09, B6).  
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from a repressive economy of self-denial only to replace it with a reorganization of sexuality directed to 
personal gratification (1992).  Very soon women realized that lifting repression did not bring the freedom 
they had longed for but only subjected them to a different set of sexual demands. They had misperceived 
the scope of power relations that controlled expression of their sexuality. By presuming that individuals 
could position themselves outside relations of power they merely exchanged one set of gender-specific 
requirements for another. On balance, that exchange failed to further their autonomy.  As Amy Allen 
points out, we can never be sure whether resistance is ever genuinely emancipatory or only feeds back into 
modes of oppression (2007).  Much bioethics discourse is still shaped by a comparably narrow conception 
of autonomy that bypasses the workings of social controls, thereby intensifying the hold of disciplinary 
practices on those who crave autonomy, obscuring human interdependencies, and ignoring disparities 
among differently situated groups.  Through such oversimplification, strategies are overlooked that could 
lead to more effective modes of resistance to dominant norms.   
With increasing recognition of underlying power relations comes an increased capacity to 
destabilize Ideologies that take motherhood to be the central event in women’s lives and  redefine women's 
bodies in ways that decenter mothering.  Destabilization creates space to identify and legitimate new 
constellations of relations that can free women to effectively construct a child-free future or shape the 
experiences of pregnancy and childbirth to accord with their own aims and desires.  Strategies are also 
underway to build participatory alliances between women in developed and developing countries that can 
more accurately identify and respond to the reproductive needs of specific groups of women.61  These 
alliances seek a new politics with a social agenda that is responsive to the consolidation of multinational 
corporate powers, such as the pharmaceutical industry).  They link feminism more closely to international 
human rights programs, broaden reproductive rights agendas to include economic rights, and emphasize 
obligations to the less well off.62  
Conceptual reform is underway too.  A number of feminist theorists are now urging 
comprehensive reconfiguration of basic moral conceptions in order to repair the individualistic bias that 
dominates leading liberal moral theories, pervades the rhetoric of reproductive medicine, and propagates 
the dogma that women cannot lead worthwhile lives without bearing children. They point out how 
individualistic bias has contributed to internalization of a misleading conception of autonomy that takes 
relational connection to be peripheral to self-identity, disregards human dependency needs, and devalues 
social and political connection.  Bioethicists within this group point to the influence this misleading self-
understanding has on the practice of clinical medicine where women patients are made to believe that their 
reproductive capacities are in need of control by medical experts.  They point to connections between 
motivations that encourage use of these technologies and political agendas that benefit from withdrawal of 
middle class women from the labor market and the consolidation of privilege through class-selective 
access to these techniques. They emphasize the need for a conceptual matrix that is responsive to the 
dominant individualistic bias.   
Scholars from several theoretical perspectives have begun to articulate alternatives to the 
generalized, individualistic conception of the self.  Care theorist Ruth Groenhout, for instance, emphasizes 
the moral requirement to give priority to the good of others (2004).  Carolyn McLeod focuses on the 
bearing of self-trust on reproductive autonomy (2002) and the tendency of some women to inappropriately 
blame themselves for their infertility (2008).  Susan Sherwin stresses connections between institutional 
frameworks and autonomy (2001c).  Along with participants in related projects, they underscore the 
importance of thinking about reproductive ethics through the lens of a relational morality that incorporates 
respect for personal agency and a developmental understanding of the self as an embodied being who is 
constituted in and through relationships.63  Shifting the dominant individualistic conception of autonomy to 
                                                            
61 On justification of such a strategy see Nikki Jones "Culture and Reproductive Health: Challenges for Feminist 
Philanthropy" 1999.  
 
62 A growing feminist literature follows this strategy.  See Cook 1994, Tong, Donchin and Dodds 2004, and Jaggar 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009.  
63 I return to this theme in a later chapter. 
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the relational understanding developed by these feminists would expand the frame of reference within 
which women’s choices are viewed to encompass scrutiny of social conditions, political context, and 
institutional structures that shape their options.  This work is still in the process of development. To date, it 
has focused predominantly on the situation of women in advanced industrialized countries.  Links with 
feminists who examine the exploitation of women’s reproductive capacities in developing economies need 
to be developed more fully.64  Hopefully, future work will draw out relationships between the turn to a 
more relational conception of autonomy and complementary feminist analyzes from the perspective of a 
globalized economy.    
The diversity of theoretical orientations I am advocating will sustain a multiple vision of feminist 
thought and avoid the hazards I have noted in positions that aim for theoretical purity.  As Donna Haraway 
points out so aptly, “single vision produces worse illusions than double vision.” (1985, 72).  Feminism’s 
double visioned talent for survival amid partial identities and conflicting standpoints testifies to one of its 
most enduring strengths.  Hopefully, the mutual interplay of theoretical reflection and practical action that 
animates current projects will rekindle the vitality that pervaded the early years of second wave feminism 
before theory and activism parted direction.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
64 Notable work has been done in recent years.  Some has focused on reproductive rights which I examine in the 
following chapter.  
